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The literature on capital controls has (at least) four very serious apples-to-oranges problems: (i) There
is no unified theoretical framework to analyze the macroeconomic consequences of controls; (ii) there
is significant heterogeneity across countries and time in the control measures implemented; (iii) there
are multiple definitions of what constitutes a “success” and (iv) the empirical studies lack a common
methodology-furthermore these are significantly “overweighted” by a couple of country cases (Chile
and Malaysia). In this paper, we attempt to address some of these shortcomings by: being very explicit
about what measures are construed as capital controls. Also, given that success is measured so differently
across studies, we sought to “standardize” the results of over 30 empirical studies we summarize in
this paper. The standardization was done by constructing two indices of capital controls: Capital Controls
Effectiveness Index (CCE Index), and Weighted Capital Control Effectiveness Index (WCCE Index).
The difference between them lies in that the WCCE controls for the differentiated degree of methodological
rigor applied to draw conclusions in each of the considered papers. Inasmuch as possible, we bring
to bear the experiences of less well known episodes than those of Chile and Malaysia. Then, using
a portfolio balance approach we model the effects of imposing capital controls on short-term flows.
We find that there should exist country-specific characteristics for capital controls to be effective.
From this simple perspective, this rationalizes why some capital controls were effective and some
were not. We also show that the equivalence in effects of price- vs. quantity-capital control are conditional
on the level of short–term capital flows.
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The literature on capital controls has (at least) four very serious issues that make it diﬃcult, if not
impossible, to compare across theoretical and empirical studies. We dub these the apples-to-oranges
problems and they include: (i) There is no uniﬁed theoretical framework (say, as in the currency
crisis literature) to analyze the macroeconomic consequences of controls; (ii) there is signiﬁcant
heterogeneity across countries and time in the capital control measures implemented; (iii) there are
multiple deﬁnitions of what constitutes a “success” (capital controls are a single policy instrument-
but there are many policy objectives); and (iv) the empirical studies lack a common methodology
and are furthermore signiﬁcantly “overweighted” by the two poster children–Chile and Malaysia.
Our goal in this paper is to ﬁnd a common ground among the non-comparabilities in the existing
literature. Of course, there is usually a level of generality that is suﬃciently encompassing. After
all, an apples-to-oranges problem can be solved by calling everything fruit. Our goal is, as far as
possible, to classify diﬀerent measures of capital controls on a uniform basis. Once done, it should
be easier to understand the cross-country and time-series experience.
Capital controls is not a new topic in the international ﬁnance arena. Academics and policy-
makers alike have been discussing the use of controls on capital inﬂows repeatedly over time. Yet,
the topic seems to suﬀer some type of “loss of memory eﬀect.” Developing countries encourage
capital inﬂows and favor an opening of their ﬁnancial accounts in their recoveries. However, as
these economies grow and appreciating pressures on their domestic currency ensue, capital inﬂows
start to look “to large” to be absorbed, and capital controls re-appear in the discussion. This would
happen until the next crisis put capital controls aside and capital account openness returns. These
capital controls cycles tend to be forgotten once the economy is back in capital openness mode,
however. What do remain, though, are the ever increasing variety of instruments that academics
and policymakers create to impose capital controls, currently adding to the “traditional” capital
controls the so-called macro-prudential regulations. Each time that capital controls resurfaces, the
apples-to-oranges expands.
We attempt to address some of these apples-to-oranges shortcomings by being very explicit
about what measures are construed as capital controls. We document not only the more drastic
diﬀerences across countries/episodes and between controls on inﬂows and outﬂows, but also the
1more subtle diﬀerences in types of inﬂow or outﬂow controls. Also, given that success is measured
so diﬀerently across studies, we standardize (wherever possible) the results of over 30 empirical
studies summarized in this paper. Inasmuch as possible, we bring to bear the experiences of
episodes less well known than those of Chile and Malaysia.
The standardization was done by constructing two indexes of capital controls: Indices of Capital
Controls Eﬀectiveness (CCE), and Weighted Capital Control Eﬀectiveness (WCCE). The diﬀerence
between them lies only in the fact that the WCCE controls for the diﬀerentiated degree of method-
ological rigor applied to draw conclusions in each of the papers considered.
Our results with these indexes can be summarized brieﬂy. Capital controls on inﬂows seem
to make monetary policy more independent, alter the composition of capital ﬂows, and reduce
real exchange rate pressures (although the evidence there is more controversial). Capital controls
on inﬂows seem not to reduce the volume of net ﬂows (and hence the current account balance).
As to controls on outﬂows, there is Malaysia and there is everybody else. In Malaysia, controls
reduced outﬂows and may have given room for more independent monetary policy (the other poster
child does not fare as well, in that our results are not as conclusive as for the Chilean controls
on inﬂows). Absent the Malaysian experience, there is little systematic evidence of “success” in
imposing controls, however deﬁned.
All of the above implies that either imposing capital controls on inﬂows or outﬂows need not
always be eﬀective. In a sense, this paper identiﬁes “initial conditions” under which controls on
capital ﬂows can be eﬀective.
The next step consists in rationalizing what we have learnt in a simple and tractable model.
We do this by using a portfolio balance approach to capital controls. The latter describes foreign
investors that have to decide under uncertainty the share of their portfolio investment to allocate
in short- vs. long-term ﬂows. The main conclusion of the model is that conditional on the elasticity
of short-term capital ﬂows to total capital ﬂows, the same capital controls could result in either an
increased, unaltered, or decreased level of short-term ﬂows as well as total capital ﬂows. Thus, it is
not clear that capital controls–even if exactly equally implemented–in two countries will necessarily
be as eﬀective (or eﬀective at all!). We also model the conditions under which price-capital-controls
(taxes imposed on the rate of return of short-term capital ﬂows) generate the same eﬀect on
2capital inﬂows as quantity-capital-controls (restrictions to the quantity of capital ﬂows permitted).
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that that its eﬀectiveness depends on the level of short-term capital ﬂows at
the moment that the controls are put in place. Thus, we obtain a model that shows that only under
very speciﬁc conditions will capital controls be eﬀective in achieving its goals, as the ﬁrst part of
the paper documents.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section summarizes some of the key reasons why capital
controls–particularly capital controls on inﬂows–are either considered or implemented. Controls, as
we note, help deal with what we dub the “four fears.” Section 3 focuses on the distinctions among
types of capital controls–highlighting the fact that not all capital control measures are created equal
and therefore they can not be simply lumped together in a rough capital controls index. Section
4 examines the existing empirical evidence by standardizing and sorting studies along a variety of
criteria. Speciﬁcally, we focus on the following sorting strategy. First, we analyze separately cases
where the papers wer multicountry or focused on a single case study; second, we distinguish the
cases where the controls were primarily designed to deal with inﬂows or outﬂows; third, we provide
an ad hoc (but uniform) criteria to rank the approach or econometric rigor applied in the study to
test hypotheses about the eﬀects of the controls; and last, we evaluate the outcomes reported in
the studies according to the deﬁnition of what constitutes a success. Then, Section 5 models the
above situations using a portfolio balance approach. The last section discusses some of the policy
implications of our ﬁndings.
2 The Rational for Capital Controls and the “Four Fears”
Anyone examining the literature on capital controls, which spans many decades and all the regions
around the globe, would be well advised to retain a sense of irony. Repeatedly, policymakers have
sought refuge in tax laws, supervisory restraint, and regulation of ﬁnancial transactions to cope
with external forces that they deem to be unacceptable. Often they rationalize their actions on
loftier grounds, sometimes so eﬀectively as to make it diﬃcult to clearly identify episodes of controls
on capital. But in all these episodes, four fears lurk beneath the surface.
32.1 Fear of Appreciation
Being the darling of investors in global ﬁnancial centers has the decided, albeit often temporary,
advantage of having ample access to funds at favorable cost. With the capital inﬂow comes upward
pressure on the exchange value of the currency, rendering domestic manufacturers less competitive
in global markets, and especially so relative to their close competitors who are not so favored as an
investment vehicle. A desire to stem such an appreciation (which Calvo and Reinhart, 2002, refer
to as “fear of ﬂoating”) is typically manifested in the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.
Over time, though, sterilizing such reserve accumulation (the topic of Reinhart and Reinhart, 1998)
becomes more diﬃcult, and more direct intervention more appealing.
2.2 Fear of “Hot Money”
For policymakers in developing countries, becoming the object of foreign investors’ attention is
particularly troubling if such aﬀection is viewed as ﬂeeting. The sudden injection of funds into a
small market can cause an initial dislocation that is mirrored by the strains associated with their
sudden withdrawal. Such a distrust of “hot money” was behind James Tobin’s initial proposal to
throw sand in the wheels of international ﬁnance, an idea that has been well received in at least
some quarters. Simply put, a high-enough tax (if eﬀectively enforced) would dissuade the initial
inﬂow and pre-empt the pain associated with the inevitable outﬂow.
2.3 Fear of Large Inﬂows
Policymakers in emerging market economies do not universally distrust the providers of foreign
capital. Not all money is hot, but sometimes the sheer volume of ﬂows matters. A large volume
of capital inﬂows, particularly when it is sometimes indiscriminate in the search for higher yields
(in the manner documented by Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart, 1994), causes dislocations in the
ﬁnancial system. Foreign funds can fuel asset price bubbles and encourage excessive risk taking by
cash-rich domestic intermediaries. Again, recourse to taxation may seem to yield a large beneﬁt.
42.4 Fear of Loss of Monetary Autonomy
The interests of global investors and domestic policymakers need not always-or even often-align.
But a trinity is always at work. It is not possible to have a ﬁxed (or highly managed) exchange
rate, monetary policy autonomy, and open capital markets (as discussed in Frankel, 2001). If there
is some attraction to retaining some element of monetary policy ﬂexibility, something has to give
up. However, in the presence of the aforementioned fear of ﬂoating, giving up capital mobility may
seem more attractive than surrendering monetary policy autonomy.
Whatever the reason for action, some forms of capital control were intended to control exchange
rate pressures, stem large inﬂows, and regain an element of monetary autonomy. And this is more
relevant for those policymakers who impose controls to reduce capital ﬂight, because investors seek-
ing safety–including, most important, domestic residents as well as foreigners–are seldom dissuaded
by regulatory restraint.
3 Capital Controls? What Do We Mean by Capital Controls?
In most of the empirical literature there are no distinctions between controls on outﬂows and
controls on inﬂows–these exercises suﬀer from the same problems as the de jure IMF classiﬁcation
of exchange rate arrangements. Even when a distinction is made between inﬂows and outﬂows (as
here), controls can and do range from the explicit to the subtle, from the market friendly to the
coercive.1
Furthermore, when considering the impacts and eﬀectiveness of capital controls one cannot lump
together the experiences of countries that have not substantially liberalized (i.e., India and China)
with countries that actually went down the path of ﬁnancial and capital account liberalization
and decided at some point to reintroduce controls, as the latter have developed institutions and
practices that are integrated in varying degrees to international capital markets.2
1There is, of course, the important issue of temporary versus permanent policies which is a distinction not addressed
here owing to the fact that most empirical studies do not focus on this issue. For a model and a discussion of the
temporary versus permanent issue see Reinhart and Smith (2002).
2Countries like China and India still have substantial capital and exchange controls. They are just progressively
levying there many restrictions. As such, isolating the eﬀects of capital controls to make them comparable is a
more diﬃcult task. Additionally, many countries use reserve requirements as an alternative to capital controls,
which although could have similar eﬀects–depending on speciﬁcs such as, e.g., whether the funds are owned by
residents or non-residents, etc.–are not considered capital controls. (They would belong to the currently labeled
5Tables 1-2, which squarely focus on measures targeted to aﬀect inﬂows and outﬂows in countries
that had already gone the route of capital account liberalization,3 indeed highlight the heterogene-
ity in both subtlety and “market-friendliness” of capital control measures that have been tried in
Asia, Europe, and Latin America during booms (these involve controls on capital inﬂows) as well
as crashes (and attempts to curb capital outﬂows). These measures diﬀer not only in subtlety and
other features but also in intensity4
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here]
4 The Empirical Literature: Finding a Common Ground
This section aims to overcome (or at least take a step in that direction) two of the apples-to-oranges
problems we have identiﬁed in the capital controls literature. Namely, we attempt to: (i) ascertain
when and in what capacity capital controls were “successful” in achieving the stated objectives of
the authorities (this is not trivial, as what constitutes as a success is deﬁned very diﬀerently across
studies), and (ii) standardize (to some extent) the very eclectic array of descriptive and empirical
methodologies and approaches that have characterized the empirical literature on capital controls.
Lastly, we bring to bear evidence on lesser well known episodes other than the ”classics” (Chile’s
controls on inﬂows starting in 1990 and Malaysia’s 1998 controls on outﬂows).
In what follows, we review more than 30 papers that study capital controls on either inﬂows
or outﬂows around the world. Some are country case studies, some describe several individual
country experiences, and some are multicountry studies that bunch several cases together. As noted
earlier, the papers measure “success” diﬀerently; thus, our aim is to standardize methodology and
results where possible so as to facilitate comparisons. Not only will this enable us to assess the
eﬀectiveness of alternative capital controls events, but it will also permit us to evaluate some of
the policy implications of imposing controls on capital inﬂows and/or outﬂows under alternative
scenarios.
“macro-prudential” regulations.) For details on reserve requirements, see Reinahrt and Reinhart (1999).
3Hence, these cases involve the reintroduction of controls.
4For a measure that “quantiﬁes” the intensity of these measures see Montiel and Reinhart (1999).
64.1 Types of Studies
We proceed as follows. First, we cluster the papers into three broad groups: (i) capital inﬂows (CI),
(ii) capital outﬂows (CO); and (iii) multi-country (MC)-the latter including the analysis of capital
inﬂows, capital outﬂow, or both. We collected studies of capital controls for the following countries
(the number of papers is shown in parentheses): For CI, there are studies on: Brazil (6), Chile
(11), Colombia (3), the Czech Republic (1), Malaysia (2), and Thailand (1). For CO, we obtained
information for Malaysia (5), Spain (3), and Thailand (2). For the MC group, we collected ﬁve
papers, covering a wide array of countries.5
4.2 Objective(s) of capital controls
Given the multiple objectives that capital controls are expected to achieve, we approached paper
with a series of questions. We asked whether, according to each paper, capital controls were able
to
1. Reduce the volume of capital ﬂows
2. Alter the composition of capital ﬂows (towards longer maturity ﬂows)
3. Reduce real exchange rate pressures
4. Allow for a more independent monetary policy
As a ﬁrst step in sorting this information, we constructed Tables 3, 4, and 5. Table 3 includes
CI episodes, Table 4 displays CO episodes, and Table 5 focuses in MC studies. As can be seen in
the tables, possible answers are YES, NO, or a blank space. If the table reads YES in any cell,
it means that the paper ﬁnds that the corresponding objective of capital controls was achieved.
NO stands for the paper ﬁnding that there was not such eﬀect as a result of the capital controls.
A blank space means that the paper does not address whether there was an eﬀect. Sometimes
the answer is followed by (ST). This indicates that the eﬀects were only temporary, i.e. that an
objective was achieved only in the Short Term. To give an example, in Table 3, the paper by
5For example, one of the more comprehensive multi-country papers uses monthly data for the period 1971-1998
for a panel of 26 countries.
7Laurens and Cardoso (1998) studying the case of the Chilean experience during the 1990’s, ﬁnds
evidence that capital controls were able to reduce the volume of capital ﬂows only in the short
term, that they were able to alter the composition of these ﬂows toward longer maturity ﬂows, and
that they were not successful in reducing pressures on the real exchange rate. They do not report
results regarding the eﬀectiveness of capital controls in making monetary policy more independent.
In a ﬁrst pass through this information, by inspection, we can summarize it as follows (see Table
6). We observe that in general, the results obtained in these papers suggest that capital controls
were successful in altering the composition of capital ﬂows toward longer maturities and in making
monetary policy more independent. However, the papers are not very informative regarding the
eﬀectiveness of capital controls in reducing the volume of capital ﬂows and reducing real exchange
rate pressures.
4.3 Indices of Capital Control Eﬀectiveness
But this is not informative enough, since it still lacks some rigor to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of
capital controls episodes. In order to better understand this, we construct two indexes of capital
controls eﬀectiveness. We call them the Capital Controls Eﬀectiveness Index (CCE Index), and
the Weighted Capital Controls Eﬀectiveness Index (WCCE Index). The only diﬀerence in com-
puting them is that the WCCE Index weighs the results obtained in each paper by the degree of
methodological rigor applied to drawing conclusions; we discuss thus further below.
In both cases, following the information summarized in Tables 3-5, we arbitrarily assigned the
following values:
If the answer is YES, the corresponding value is 1.
If the answer is NO, the value assigned is -1.
If the question is not addressed at all, it corresponds to a value of 0.
These values are designed to equally weigh the existence or non existence of eﬀects as a result
of the imposition of capital controls and to give no weight to questions not addressed, so as not to
distort the results in case any objective of capital controls is not addressed by the paper.
With these values at hand, for each country we computed simple averages of these numbers
for each of the four questions we brought to the papers. This gives, for example, a CCE Index
8for volume reduction for each country, a CCE Index for real exchange rate pressure reduction for
each country, and so on. With this information we are able to compare, for each objective, which
country was most eﬀective.
We also used this information to compute an aggregate index of capital controls eﬀectiveness,
by averaging out the four CCE Indexes for each country, and then compare a global CCE Index
across countries.
However, as has already been mentioned, the methodology used in these papers to evaluate
success is highly heterogeneous. Some papers are mainly descriptive, generating conclusions from
the movements (or lack thereof) in the time series of the main variables, and lack any rigorous
statistical or econometric analysis. Other papers use some statistical or econometric methodology
to evaluate capital control, but events among them, there is still wide variation in the degree of
rigor used to extract conclusions from the data.
In order to control for these diﬀerences, we made another pass through the information in
the papers. We classify each study according to the degree of methodological rigor in, LOW,
INTERMEDIATE, and HIGH according to the following criteria6:
Low: This includes studies that consist mainly of descriptive analysis of events and/or time
series.
Intermediate: This groups papers that draw conclusions from a more formal evaluation of
events but still lack any formal hypothesis testing. An example would be papers that perform time
re-scaling to compare the eﬀects of capital controls in a “before capital controls” and “after capital
controls” analysis.
High: This includes only those studies that have highly developed econometric techniques,
with a well deﬁned hypothesis testing.
Table 7 (in the Appendix) summarizes the methodology used in each paper, as well as the
corresponding classiﬁcation as Low, Intermediate, High, following these deﬁnitions.
In order to compute the WCCE Index, we assigned the following values:
Low: 0.1
6The reader should understand that our low, intermediate, high characterization should not be construed as
evaluating or comparing the overall quality of the various studies incorporated here. Rather, it is only a very narrow
index of econometric sophistication. The reader is perfectly free to decide that this index is positively, negatively, or
uncorrelated with the overall credibility of the diﬀerent studies.
9Intermediate: 0.5
High: 1.
With these values at hand, we compute the WCCE Index similarly to the CCE Index, in order
to determine which country has been most eﬀective in achieving each of the four objectives. We also
compute an aggregate (per country) WCCE Index. This enables us to understand which countries
capital controls were more useful in. Furthermore, given this information we can, at least as a
ﬁrst approximation, ﬁnd conditions under which capital controls tend to be eﬀective. Once more,
it is worth mentioning that these exercises were done separately for the 3 clusters into which we
separated the papers: CI, CO, and MC.
4.4 Summary of Results
Summary results of the CCE and WCCE Indexes are presented in Table 8 (Panels A, B and C).
From these indexes, we can extract the following policy conclusions. Looking at the data on controls
on inﬂows (Panel A) along with the preliminary results in Table 6, we see that capital controls were
able to make monetary policy more independent, alter the composition of capital ﬂows toward
longer maturities, and reduce real exchange rate pressures (although the evidence on the latter is
more controversial). Interestingly, the usual model economy for this type of controls, Chile, stands
out as achieving these goals quite comfortably, as the WCCE Index shows. In this regard, initial
conditions or characteristics such as those in Chile in the early 1990’s, along with the continuing
reforms during the 1990’s, appear to be necessary conditions in order for capital controls on inﬂows
to be eﬀective. On the other hand, capital controls on inﬂows were not very eﬀective in reducing
the volume of net ﬂows (hence the impact of these ﬂows on the current account balance).
Looking in more detail, we see that Malaysia (1994) stands out as the best performer in terms
of reducing the volume of capital ﬂows, Chile dominates regarding the change in capital ﬂows
maturity, Thailand is superior in respect to reducing real exchange rate pressures, and Chile again
dominates in regard to monetary policy independence. Overall, as the average of the WCCE Index
reﬂects, Chile emerges as the most successful example of capital controls on inﬂows.
Let us now focus on capital controls on outﬂows (Panel B), the received wisdom is that Malaysia
(1997) is the example to follow. From our results, we can see that these capital controls were eﬀective
10in reducing capital outﬂows and in making monetary policy more independent. Yet, the results
from WCCE Index are not as conclusive as those on the Chilean controls on inﬂows.
If we focus on the reduction in capital ﬂows, Thailand and Spain dominate Malaysia. Regarding
the switch in capital ﬂows towards longer maturity, no conclusion can be extracted. Spain emerges
as the best in real exchange rate pressures reduction; on the other hand, Malaysia clearly dominates
at making monetary policy more independent. On the aggregate, Malaysia appears to be the most
successful in its experience of capital controls on outﬂows.
Some further comments are in order. First, it could be argued that these indexes are not taking
into account many other variables that might be aﬀecting the eﬀectiveness of capital controls,
especially the set of “other” reforms being put in place in each country during each capital controls
episode. That is true. However, this paper is reviewing and assessing only the conclusions contained
in previous papers, not the papers themselves. All the reviewed papers draw conclusions from their
information sets, and we just put them together and try to extract the main message that these
papers give as a group. Furthermore, it is precisely because of this “omitted variables bias” type
of problem is that our WCCE Index becomes more relevant. For example, any structural reform
carried on in parallel with capital controls is not usually speciﬁcally reﬂected in the papers we
review; in a sense, for us this is similar to running a regression with missing data that we have
to control for. This is where the degree of methodological rigor becomes important. The more
formal the analysis is, especially if it includes hypothesis testing, the more accurate the information
contained in it.
Second, a similar reasoning applies to the endogeneity of capital controls. Some could argue
that we should control for it. Again, we rely on the conclusions obtained in previous papers, thus
giving more value to the results we obtain from WCCE Index. Also, this is relevant for how controls
on capital inﬂows aﬀect capital outﬂows. Moreover, that is why we cluster CI and CO separately
in our analysis.
Third, it is worth mentioning that the papers we review are clearly not the only ones dealing
with long-run capital controls. There are many papers that analyze the long-run eﬀects of capital
controls, whereas we focus on the short-run only, as can be seen from the questions with which we
approach the papers.
11Fourth, another interesting point is whether capital control regimes are transitory or permanent.
Here, as the questions we focus on clearly reveal, we are interested only in transitory events. This
is why episodes such as the Chinese or Indian approach to capital controls are not covered here;
see the papers on these countries contained in the NBER volume edited by Sebastian Edwards for
this purpose.
Fifth, an interesting point to raise is related to the timing (and related endogeneity) of capital
controls: whether they are imposed in response to events–crises–or if they are designed in advance.
Here, once more, we lack information because we rely only on what the papers conclude. It is
worth mentioning, though, that by inspection it appears that the Malaysian (1997) episode could
have been designed in advance, unlike most of the other episodes, and contrary to common wisdom.
This theory emerges from the chronologies given in Tables 1 and 2. In the case of Malaysia (1997),
a great quantity of controls were imposed on September 1st, 1997. Furthermore, the level of detail
in seems to suggest that they were not decided upon and designed just in response to the crises.
Sixth, sometimes temporary capital control events become permanent. This could be because
of time consistency problems or just because of the current response to future changes: rational
expectations call for incorporating into your current decision the fact that in a pre-speciﬁed time
period capital controls will be levied. Furthermore, even if a country imposed capital controls and
did relax them at the pre-established date, this might work as a signal that capital controls could
be imposed in the future if needed. However, this signal says nothing about the controls being
either good or bad–many things will inﬂuence the latter, especially the controls’ eﬀectiveness, as
well as their eﬀects on property rights. At any rate, imposing capital controls once establishes
a precedent regarding a country’s position toward capital mobility, despite the costs and beneﬁts
of such controls. This is another dimension in which temporary capital controls might become
“permanent”.
[Insert Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 about here]
5 A Portfolio Balance Approach to Capital Controls
Received wisdom from previous sections thus suggests that temporary capital controls should deliver
the following:
12 Alter capital ﬂows composition towards longer maturities
 Reduce capital ﬂows
 Generate monetary policy independence through interest rates diﬀerentials
 Reduce real exchange rate pressures
This section develops a simple model to explain why these should be the outcome of imposing
capital controls, separating controls on capital inﬂows and on capital outﬂows7
We study a two-period small open economy that receives a ﬂow of external capital in period t
of size Ft. For simplicity, these ﬂows will be either short term ﬂows, St, or long term ﬂows, Lt. The
random real rate of return on these capital ﬂows are r for long term capital ﬂows and r∗ for short
terms ﬂows. Given risk parameters, without loss of generality, we assume throughout that r∗ > r.
Ft = St + Lt (1)
Short term ﬂows represent a share x of total capital ﬂows, such that
St = xFt (2)
where x is endogenous and results from the optimization program of foreign investors.
5.1 Foreign Investors
There is a unit mass of foreign investors. Given the random nature of the rates of return on each
type of capital ﬂows, the optimization problem is characterized in terms of solving an expected
utility maximization in terms of means and variances-covariances. The representative agent will
solve for the portfolio composition of these capital ﬂows in terms of the parameters of the model
such as its risk preferences. Thus, the agent solves the following problem:
7Of course it would be desirable to have a full-blown general equilibrium stochastic model of capital ﬂows. But
general equilibrium models do not easily extend to the kind of diverse capital market imperfections and obstacles
that characterize the vast majority of countries that have implemented controls. (For example, aggregation becomes
much more diﬃcult in the presence of capital market imperfections; see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ 1996.) Furthermore, the
theoretical literature on capital controls is not quite abundant. Notable exceptions being, among others, Bartolini
and Drazen (1997), Reinhart and Smith (2002), and Reinhart (2000). Therefore, the model in this paper intends to
partially ﬁll this gap, as a benchmark to model the results obtained above.
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w) (3)
where the expected rate of return on capital ﬂows, w, is given by
w = (1 + r)Ft + (r∗   r)xFt (4)











i stands for the variance of variable i and ij refers to the covariance between i and j.
From the FOC’s, we obtain
x =




where  = (2
r + 2
r   2rr), and Φ represents the coeﬃcient of risk aversion.
Notice that the share of capital ﬂows devoted to short term ﬂows increase with the yield diﬀer-
ential and decreases with risk aversion, in line with standard portfolio selection models.
Alternatively, we can write this as
x =
r∗   r






Were  represents the share of capital ﬂows to minimize the variance of ﬂows. Equation (7)
separates the speculative component of this ﬂows share and the component that corresponds to
minimize the portfolio variance. The latter depends only on the relative riskiness of each type of
capital ﬂow.
145.2 Capital Controls on Inﬂows
Let’s modify slightly the above set up to incorporate capital controls on inﬂows. Without loss of
generality, assume that capital controls, , can take on only two values: 0 for no capital controls,





0 if @ capital controls
 > 0 if 9 capital controls
(9)
where 0 <  < 1. Let’s now re-deﬁne the real return on short term ﬂows as r′∗, such that the after-
capital-controls real rate of return on short term ﬂows is now given by (1 + r∗) = (1 + r′∗)(1   ).
Maturity Structure of Capital Flows
Given this very simple framework, we now proceed to analyze the outcome of imposing capital
controls on inﬂows. Suppose the economy starts with no capital control and unexpectedly imposes
capital controls on inﬂows. Simply put, this represents a decrease in r∗. The result is summarized
in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Imposing capital controls reduces the share of short-term capital ﬂows.







This implies that as a result of imposing capital controls, external ﬁnancing in the form of short
term capital ﬂows is reduced–i.e the relative size of long term ﬂows, L, increases.
Aggregation
The analysis above refers to each individual investor. This subsection aggregates over the economy.
We assume for simplicity that agents share the information but have potentially diﬀerent wealth
and/or risk aversion, which are idiosyncratic characteristics.
15Total demand for short term ﬂows for investor j with wealth Wj is given by xjWj–where, as
mentioned, xj in conditional on the individual investor’s risk aversion. The economy’s aggregate





































where, after some manipulation we obtain











Wj=W as the aggregate risk aversion.
With the latter, we can state Proposition 2, which is just the aggregate of Proposition 1:
Proposition 2. In the aggregate, introducing capital control results in a reduction of short-term
capital ﬂows as a share of total capital ﬂows.
Proof: analogous to Proposition 1
@r∗
@(V ∗=W)
= Φ2 > 0 (16)
16
Notice that so far we have just shown that in response to imposing capital controls, the share
of short-term ﬂows to total ﬂows decreases. However, we still have to explain if this results from a
reduction in the level of short-term ﬂows, an increase in the level of total ﬂows, or both. For the
moment we can thus safely state that imposing capital controls on short term ﬂows increases the
maturity structure of capital ﬂows, but not necessarily reduce the level of capital ﬂows. This is
consistent with the evidence in this paper as well as in Magud and Reinhart (2005). Next section
analyzes this by focusing on the determinants of the composition of capital ﬂows.
Determinants
We want to further analyze the conditions under which the above mentioned reactions to capital
controls hold.
Notice that all else equal, capital control generates a higher level of capital ﬂows. This can be






2 < 0 (17)
The intuition for the latter is that for an investor (or the aggregate market) to obtain the same
expected rate of return in response to the introduction of capital controls, total capital ﬂows should
increase.









(18) can be manipulated to obtain the following two expressions:
dr∗

















where   dV 
dW
W
V  stands for the elasticity of short term capital ﬂows with respect to total capital
ﬂows.
These expressions are then summarized in two new propositions.
Proposition 3. The eﬀects of imposing capital controls on short term capital ﬂows depend on the
elasticity of short term capital ﬂows with respect to total capital lows such that:
1. For 0 <  < 1 : dr
dV  < 0 Short term capital ﬂows levels increase
2. For  = 1 : dr
dV  = 0 Short term capital ﬂows levels remain unaltered
3. For  > 1 : dr
dV  > 0 Short term capital ﬂows levels decrease
Proof: see (19).
Proposition 4. The eﬀects of imposing capital controls on short term capital ﬂows depend on the
elasticity of short term capital ﬂows with respect to total capital lows such that:
1. For 0 <  < W : dr
dW < 0 Total capital ﬂows levels increase
2. For  = W : dr
dW = 0 Total capital ﬂows levels do not change
3. For  > W : dr
dW > 0 Total capital ﬂows levels decrease
Proof: see (20).
The interesting point of Propositions 3 and 4 is that, unlike common wisdom, it is not necessarily
the case that by introducing capital controls the maturity structure of the economy will lengthen
and that capital ﬂows will be instantaneously reduced. The conditions under which these happen
are not trivial. In turn, this supports the wide variety of the results–and many times of contradicting
nature–that the empirical literature has found, as surveyed in Magud and Reinhart (2005), and
complemented in this paper.
For example, Proposition 4 reﬂects the facts that only for suﬃciently large values of  we will
able to observe a reduction in the volume of capital ﬂows resulting from imposing capital controls.
18This is also consistent with the mentioned survey in which the evidence shows how many times
capital controls were able to reduce capital ﬂows, but some other they were not. In this regard,
a separate paper could empirically asses the value of  to verify if the countries for which capital
controls were successful correspond to those with high –and those with lower  were not able to
reduce capital ﬂows.
Also, as Proposition 3 shows, not every capital control episode should necessarily be able to
increase the maturity of capital ﬂows. However, given that the evidence is more conclusive in that
more times that not capital controls were able to achieve this objective, it is probably the case that
for many of the countries that put these controls in place the value of  was greater than 1.
Quantity vs. Price Restrictions
Given the diversity observed in terms of alternative capital controls episodes, one interesting ques-
tion to analyze is what is the required tax rate on rates on returns that should be imposed to obtain
any speciﬁc level of change in the maturity composition of capital ﬂows? To answer this question
we return to (15). Re-writing it in slightly diﬀerent way:
X =
r∗   r
Φ2 +  (21)
where X stands for the aggregate share of short term capital in total aggregate capital. For any








XΦ2 > 0 (23)
Notice how (23) established the percentage change in the volume of capital ﬂows that will be
obtain by any percentage change in the rate of return on short term capital ﬂows, namely by
imposing capital controls. This semi-elasticity reﬂects how much each percentage point of capital
controls reduces the volume of short term ﬂows.
19This leads us to our next proposition:
Proposition 5. Conditional on the aggregate volume of short-term capital ﬂows observed in the
instant prior to the application of capital controls, there exists a quantity restriction of capital ﬂows
that will generate the same eﬀects on capital ﬂows as imposing taxes on the rate of return on short
term capital ﬂows.
Proof: see (23).
Notice the importance of the latter proposition in that the quantitative restriction depend on
the level of short term ﬂows when the controls are imposed. The higher the volume of aggregate
short term ﬂows, the smaller the level restrictions should be to generate a similar eﬀect as controls
on rates of return.
Monetary Policy Independence
The reduction in capital ﬂows also creates a wedge in interest rates, giving the central bank an
increased monetary independence to implement counter-cyclical policies. This results directly from
the expression that deﬁnes the relation between short term interest rates before and after capital
controls, (1 + r∗) = (1 + r′∗)(1   ). In the presence of capital controls the wedge is given by the
rate of taxation on the real rates of return, such that r∗ > r′∗.
Real Exchange Rate Pressures
Given domestic savings, the current account will be ﬁnanced entirely by external capital ﬂows, such
that,
F = W = CA(e);CA′ < 0 (24)
where e represents the real exchange rate. The latter expression states that if the economy experi-
ences a current account deﬁcit, in equilibrium, the real exchange rate will depreciate.8
8This relationship is easy to obtain from ﬁrst principles by just assuming a two-good economy in which the
production function of tradables is increasing in the real exchange rate and non-tradable output is either exogenously
given or decreasing in the real exchange rate. Alternatively, it can be obtained by solving the domestic consumer’s
problem in a two-good economy –either by introducing a cash-in advance constraint or money in the utility function.
20If the economy is unexpectedly under capital controls, we already showed that capital ﬂows
will be reduced. This reduces the current account deﬁcit. In equilibrium, this should drive the
exchange rate up, i.e. a real depreciation, to equilibrate the current account in the presence of less
capital ﬂows to ﬁnance the domestic economy.
Notice how the analysis of Propositions 3 and 4 directly extend to observing whether capital
control are able or not to aﬀect the real exchange rate.
5.3 Capital Controls on Outﬂows
For controls on capital outﬂows, the analysis is simpler since these types of controls, by deﬁnition,
focus on restricting the volume of capital trying to leave the country. In terms of the above model,
an easy way to represent this is by a reduction in W, exogenously imposed. All else equal, inspection







Which can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 6. The marginal unit of short term ﬂows is allocated in to keep the average share of
short term capital ﬂows constant.
Proof: see (25).
Thus, imposing these controls can reduce the volume of capital outﬂows, but cannot change the
maturity structure of these ﬂows. Regarding exchange rates and monetary policy, the results for
capital controls on inﬂows remains the same. The latter result is also consistent with the evidence
that we document.
6 Conclusions
In sum, capital controls on inﬂows seem to: make monetary policy more independent; alter the
composition of capital ﬂows; and reduce real exchange rate pressures (although the evidence here
is more controversial).9 Capital controls on inﬂows, however, seem not to reduce the volume of net
9According to the WCCI, Chile stands out in achieving these goals.
21ﬂows (and, hence, the current account balance).
As for controls on capital outﬂows, there is Malaysia ... and there is everybody else. In Malaysia,
controls reduce outﬂows and may make room for more independent monetary policy.10 There is
little evidence of “success” in other countries attempting to control outﬂows, either in terms of
altering the volume or regaining monetary policy independence. These ﬁndings are in line with
those of the earlier literature focused on capital ﬂight (as in Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez, 1996)
and dual or parallel exchange markets (an in Kiguel, Lizondo, and O’Connell 1997).
While the eﬀectiveness of controls varies across time, country, and type of measures used,
limiting private external borrowing in the “good times” plays an important prudential role, because
more often than not countries are “debt intolerant”. Indeed, often the critical problem in good
times is that countries borrow too much!11
While our study has made the case for the need to distinguish measures primarily designed to
discourage inﬂows from those that primarily aim at curbing outﬂows, it would be worthwhile for
future research to attempt to ascertain whether there are also important diﬀerences in achieving
“success” between measures that are more market friendly (as in the Chilean reserve requirements)
versus those that are based on more blunt quantitative restrictions. Furthermore, in this study,
owing to the nature of most of the empirical work reviewed here (which treats the control measures
as single episodes), it would be interesting for policy purposes to examine diﬀerences between short
run and long run impacts of the measures, to ascertain how quickly control measures lose their
eﬀectiveness.
As long as capital ﬂows to emerging markets remain volatile and potentially disruptive, the
discussion of capital controls in academic and policy circles will remain alive, and hence there is a
real need to evaluate their eﬀectiveness, however deﬁned. As noted earlier, it is an old discussion.
Tobin’s seminal paper dates back to the 1970s. Furthermore, capital controls have historically
been used to deal with the ﬁckle capital ﬂow cycle for at least two hundred years. Indeed, as in
past inﬂow episodes, at the time of this writing countries like Colombia and Argentina either have
implemented controls on capital inﬂows or are contemplating doing so.
10Yet, the results for Malaysia based on the WCCI are not as conclusive as for the Chilean controls on inﬂows.
11See Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano (2003) for details.
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Table1.  Restrictions on Inflows and “Prudential Requirements:” Asia 
 
Country and date (in parentheses) denoting the first year of the surge in inflows 
 
Indonesia (1990) 
March, 1991:  Central Bank adopts measures to discourage offshore borrowing.  Bank Indonesia begins to 
scale down its swap operations by reducing individual banks' limits from 25 to 20 percent of capital.  The 
three-month swap premium was raised by 5 percentage points. 
October, 1991:  All state-related offshore commercial borrowing was made subject to prior approval by the 
Government and annual ceilings were set for new commitments over the next five years. 
November, 1991: Further measures are taken to discourage offshore borrowing. The limits on banks' net open 
market foreign exchange positions were tightened by placing a separate limit on off-balance sheet positions.   
Bank Indonesia also announced that future swap operations (except for "investment swaps" with maturities of 




June, 2010: Required holding period on foreign capital inflows and central bank notes were increased to 1 




June 1, 1992:  Limits on non-trade-related swap transactions were imposed on commercial banks. 
January 17, 1994-August 1994:  Banks were subject to a ceiling on their non-trade- or noninvestment-related 
external liabilities. 
January 24, 1994-August 1994:  Residents were prohibited from selling short-term monetary instruments to 
nonresidents. 
February 2, 1994-August 1994:  Commercial banks were required to place with Bank Negara the ringgit 
funds of foreign banking institutions (Vostro accounts) held in non-interest bearing accounts.  However, in the 
January-May period these accounts were considered part of the eligible liabilities base for the calculation of 
required reserves, resulting in a negative effective interest rate in Vostro balances. 
February 23, 1994-August 1994:  Commercial banks are not allowed to undertake non-trade related swap 








October, 2010: Caps on over-the-counter FX purchases for non-trade purposes by residents without 
documentation were raised from USD30,000 to USD60,000. Cap tourists’ purchases upon departure without 
documentation  was increased from USD200 to USD5000. Caps on residents' FX purchases for advance 
payments of import transactions without documentation increased from USD100,000 to USD1million. No 
approval required to prepay central bank-registered foreign currency debt of the private sector. For foreign 
investors' outward remittances, banks are now allowed to convert peso funds. The annual limit on the amount 
each resident may buy from banks for outward investments and purchases of Philippine offshore debt has 
been raised from USD30million to USD60million. 
 
Russia (2010) 
September, 2010: In 2011, interest payments on FX borrowing exceeding 0.8 times the refinance rate of the 
central bank will be subject to corporate profit tax. 
 
South Africa (2010) 
February, 2010: to encourage outflows, banks were allowed to invest up to 25% of non-equity liabilities in 
external portfolios.   28
Thailand (1988) 
Banks and finance companies net foreign exchange positions may not exceed 20 percent of capital. 
Banks and finance companies net foreign liabilities may not exceed 20 percent of capital. 
Residents are not allowed to hold foreign currency deposits except only for trade-related purposes. 
April, 1990:  Banks and finance companies net foreign exchange positions limit raised to 25 percent of 
capital. 
August 8, 1995:  Reserve requirements, to be held in the form of non-interest bearing deposits at the Bank of 
Thailand, on short-term non-resident baht accounts were raised from 2 percent to 7 percent.  While reserve 
requirements on domestic deposits are also 7 percent, up to 5 percent can be held in the form of interest-
bearing public bonds. 
December 1995: The 7 percent reserve requirement is extended to finance companies short-term (less than 
one year) promissory notes held by non-residents. 
A variety of measures aimed at reducing foreign-financed lending were introduced. 
April 19, 1996:  Offshore borrowing with maturities of less than 1 year by commercial banks, BIBF offices, 
finance companies and finance and security companies will be subject to a 7-percent minimum reserve 
requirement in the form of a nonremunerated deposit with the Bank of Thailand.  Loans for trade purposes 
will be exempt. 
 
Thailand (2010) 
June, 2010: Limits on foreign asset accumulation by Thai residents (including outward FDI) were raised. 
September, 2010: Limits on direct overseas investment were removed, restrictions on lending by Thai firms 
to foreign borrowers were relaxed, and the cap on offshore property purchase was increased. 
October, 2010: For new Thai bonds issued by government and government sponsored entities, a 15% 
withholding tax on foreigners' interest and capital gains was reinstated.  Central bank asked brokerages to start 
submitting daily reports of non-resident clients' outstanding cash assets. 
 
South Korea (2009) 
2009: To dampen real estate prices, ceilings on LTV rations lowered in Seoul. 
November, 2009: Required domestic banks to fully match mid-to-long-term asset holdings with mid-to-long 
term funding. Limits on currency forward transactions were lowered from 125% to 100% of real transactions 
being hedged. Domestic banks are required to manage FX liquidity ratio on a daily basis. 
Februar,y 2010: Withholding tax of 0-15% on interest, capital gains tax (10% of total selling amount or 20% 
of net margin), and transaction tax (0.3% of selling price) were removed. 
June, 2010: Local banks' FX forward positions were limited to 50% of their equity capital. Forward positions 
for local branches of foreign banks were limited to 250% of capital (with 3 months to meet new ceiling and 2 
years to cover existing positions). 
November, 2010: Tax on profit on government bonds for foreigners: 14%. 
 
Turkey (2010) 
2010: Withholding tax was cut to 0% for institutional investors and to 10% for retail investors irrespective of 
residency.  
Sources:  Alfiler (1994), Bank Indonesia, Annual Report, various issues, Bank Negara, Annual Report, 
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Table1. (continued)  Restrictions on Inflows and Prudential Requirements: Eastern Europe 
and Latin America 
 
 




December, 2001: Put in force prohibition against investors transferring funds abroad. 
2003: Registration requirement and 180-day minimum investment period for inflows into equity markets. 
2005: Implemented minimum stay period of 12 months. Made compulsory deposit of 30% (those bringing 
money into the country must deposit a share of the funds in non-interest bearing account), and imposed 
tax/restrictions on capital outflows. 
 
Brazil (1992) 
October, 1994:   A 1 percent tax on foreign investment in the stock market.  Eliminated on March 10, 1995. 
The tax on Brazilian companies issuing bonds overseas was raised from 3 percent to 7 percent of the total.  
Eliminated on March 10, 1995. 
The tax paid by foreigners on fixed interest investments in Brazil was raised from 5 percent to 9 percent.  
Reduced back to 5 percent on March 10, 1995. 
The Central Bank raised limits on the amount of dollars that can be bought on foreign exchange markets. 
 
Brazil (2006) 
February, 2006: Income tax of 15% cut to 0% for foreign investors in the local fixed income market—
previously, only equity investors were exempt.                                                                                                        
March, 2008: IOF tax (Tobin-type tax on entry) of 1.5% on fixed income investments by foreigners.   
October, 2008: IOF tax on fixed income investments by foreigners reduced from 1.5% back to zero. 
October, 2009: 2% IOF on stock and bond market purchases. 
November, 2009: Tax on the issuance of depositary receipts in international markets. 
October, 2010: IOF increased to 4% for fixed income investments and equity funds (IOF on individual 
equities left at 2%). IOF increased to 6% for fixed income investments, and from 0.38% to 6% on margin 
deposits for derivative transactions.  Loopholes for IOF on margin requirements closed. 
 
Chile (1990) 
June, 1991:  Nonrenumerated 20 percent reserve requirement to be deposited at the Central Bank for a period 
of one year on liabilities in foreign currency for direct borrowing by firms.   
The stamp tax of 1.2 percent a year (previously paid by domestic currency credits only) was applied to foreign 
loans as well.  This requirement applies to all credits during their first year, with the exception of trade loans. 
May, 1992: The reserve requirement on liabilities in foreign currency for direct borrowing by firms is raised 
to 30 percent.  Hence, all foreign currency liabilities have a common reserve requirement. 
 
Colombia (1991) 
June, 1991:  A 3 percent withholding tax on foreign exchange receipts from personal services rendered 
abroad and other transfers, which could be claimed as credit against income tax liability. 
February, 1992:  Banco de la Republica increases its commission on its cash purchases of foreign exchange 
from 1.5 percent to 5 percent. 
June, 1992: Regulation of the entry of foreign currency as payment for services. 
September, 1993: A nonrenumerated 47 percent reserve requirement to be deposited at the Central Bank on 
liabilities in foreign currency for direct borrowing by firms.  The reserve requirement is to be maintained for 
the duration of the loan and applies to all loans with a maturity of 18 months or less, except for trade credit.   
August, 1994: Nonrenumerated reserve requirement to be deposited at the Central Bank on liabilities in 
foreign currency for direct borrowing by firms.  The reserve requirement is to be maintained for the duration 
of the loan and applies to all loans with a maturity of five years or less, except for trade credit with a maturity 
of four months or less.  The percentage of the requirement declines as the maturity lengthens; from 
140 percent for funds that are 30 days or less to 42.8 percent for five year funds.   
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Colombia (2002) 
December, 2004: Foreigners investing in domestic markets must now keep their money in the country for at 
least one year. 
 
Colombia (2007) 
May, 2007: 40 percent unremunerated reserve requirements (URR) on external borrowing on the back of 
ceiling on currency derivative positions (banks should keep overall gross positions on these instruments no 
larger than 500 percent of their capital). Later, these restrictions were extended to portfolio inflows by foreign 
residents. Early withdrawals were allowed with penalties from 1.6 percent (if held by 5 months) to 9.4 percent 
(for immediate withdrawal) of the reserve requirements. 
June, 2007: exemption for equities issued abroad.  
December, 2007: URR eliminated for equities’ IPO. 
May, 2008: URR on inflows raised to 50 % with 2-year minimum stay on FDI. Gross derivative positions’ 
limits were raised to 550 percent of capital. 
June, 2008: penalties for URR early withdrawal were raised. 
September, 2007: minimum stay for FDI revoked, purchases of equities exempted from URR 
October, 2008: controls were eliminated. 
 
Czech Republic (1992) 
April, 1995:  The central bank introduced a fee of 0.25 percent on its foreign exchange transactions with 
banks, with the aim of discouraging short-term speculative flows. 
August 1, 1995: A limit on net short-term (less than one year) foreign borrowing by banks is introduced. 
Each bank is to ensure that its net short-term liabilities to nonresidents, in all currencies, do not exceed the 
smaller of 30 percent of claims on nonresidents or Kc 500 million. 
Administrative approval procedures seek to slow down short-term borrowing by nonbanks.  
 
Czech Republic (2008) 
2008: 40% non-interest reserve requirement for portfolio flows (IPOs excluded). 
 
Mexico (1990) 
April, 1992: A regulation that limited foreign currency liabilities of commercial banks to 10 percent of their 
total loan portfolio was passed.  Banks had to place 15 percent of these liabilities in highly liquid instruments 
 
Peru (2009) 
2009: Foreign purchases of central bank bills were banned, reserve requirements all deposits were increased 
(local currency deposits held by foreigners raised to 120%)., and  reserve requirement on other foreign 
liabilities with maturity less than 2 years were increased to 75%. 
2010: Fee on foreign purchases of central bank liquidity draining instruments was increased to 400 basis 
points. 30% for transactions through a Peruvian broker and 5% for transactions through a foreign broker 
Capital gains tax for non-residents' investments in the domestic stock market were imposed. Imposed a 30% 
tax on foreign investor gains from PEN-denominated futures maturing within 60 days. 
January, 2010: 30% income tax introduced for settlement of derivative contract with offshore banks 
(imposed on local financial institutions). 
February, 2010: Banking regulator changed limits on net FX positions: a) Long net FX positions reduced to 
75% of net equity from 100%, b) short net FX positions raised to 15% of net equity from 10%. 
June, 2010: Private pension funds' limit on trading FX imposed at 0.85% of AUM (for daily transactions) and 
1.95% of UAUM (over 5-day period). 
.                                                                                                                                                                                  
 Sources:  Banco Central de Chile, (1991 and 1992), Banco de la Republica, Colombia (1993 and 1994), 
Banco de Mexico (1992), Clements and Kamil (2009), Rincon and Toro (2010), and Conselho Monetario 
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Table 2.  Restrictions on Outflows: Asia, Europe, and Latin America 
 
Country and date (in parentheses) denoting the first year of the surge in outflows (or crisis) 
 
Argentina (crisis ending the Convertibility Plan, 2001) 
December, 2001: The Corralito is established, limiting bank withdrawal limits and restrictions on dollar transfer
and loans. However, purchases through checks or credit cards available, and purchases of government bonds. 
Dec.30:  suspension of external payments (debt default). January 2002 there is a 40% devaluation and a dual 
exchange rate regime is introduced (1.4 pesos per dollar for trade operations, while floating regime for all other 
transactions. Later in the month, there is an. easing of bank withdrawals restrictions followed by an asymmetric 
pesofication. Pesofication of dollar deposits at 1.4 pesos per dollar; dollar debts pesofied at market exchange rat
unification of exchange rate regimes in a floating scheme; right to withdraw wages and pension incomes in full;
Corralon is imposed: freeze of bank term deposits. In September of that year it is required that stocks should be 
traded in domestic currency regulation. Since the latter is widely resisted, it was eased, but the new restriction 
significantly increased transactions costs.  In December 2002 the Corralito is rescinded. 
 
Brazil, (crisis ending the Real Plan, 1999) 
March 1999: Government ordered local investment funds to increase their holdings of government bonds. 
The central bank raised to 80 percent from 60 percent the minimum amount of sovereign debt that must be held 
the country foreign investment fund. This lowered the share that could be held in other countries’ debt. 
 
Malaysia (Asian crisis, 1997) 
September, 1998:: Bank and foreign exchange controls limiting offshore swap operations, ban on short-selling. 
1998: repatriation of ringgit held offshore, and strict regulation on offshore operations and most international 
operations in ringgit, export and import operations allowed in foreign currency only, 12-month waiting period fo
non-residents to sell profits from Malaysian securities, approval required to invest abroad    (above certain limits
In December residents are allowed to grant loans to nonresidents to purchase immovable property. In January, 
1999 some derivative transactions for nonresidents are permitted. In February there is a gradual ease on the 12-
month waiting period and some repatriations funds exempted from exit regulations. In March exports and impor
trade ceilings are raised for operations with Thailand. In September commercial banks allowed to enter into som
short-term currency swaps with nonresident stockbrokers. In March, 2000 funds from sale of securities purchase
by nonresidents can be repatriated without paying exit levy and in June administrative procedures to ease 
classification of securities as being free from exit levy. September 30
th: Some offshore banks are allowed to inve
in ringgit assets. December 1
st: foreign-owned banks are allowed to increase domestic credit. In February 2001 t
exit levy is abolished for some operations. In May of that year the remaining exit levy is abolished. While in Jun
all controls on nonresidents’ futures and options are abolished. In July, resident financial institutions allowed to 
extend ringgit loans to nonresidents investing in immovable property in Malaysia. In November 2002, resident 
banks credit levels to finance nonresidents projects in Malaysia are raised. On December 3
rd: foreign currency 
limit for investment abroad by residents is abolished, and payments are liberalized to allow them to be in either 
ringgit or foreign currency. 
Spain (ERM Crisis, 1992)
September, 1992: Bank of Spain suspends regular money market operations and introduces foreign exchange 
controls.  In October of that year the peseta is devalued and some of the controls a re lifted—in November the 
remaining foreign exchange controls rescinded. 
 
Thailand (Asian crisis, 1997) 
May, 1997: Bank of Thailand (BOT) introduces restrictions on capital account transactions.  In June BOT 
introduces additional measures to limit capital flows. Baht proceeds from sales of stocks required to be converte
at the onshore exchange rate. Additional controls are introduced and later in the month a two-tier exchange rate 
introduced. In September of that year, Additional controls on invisible and current account transactions are 
introduced.  In January 1998 it is required that proceeds on exports and invisible transactions and current accoun
transfers must be surrendered after 7 days (instead of 15 days). BOT ends two-tier exchange rate regime.at the e
of that month  
Sources: Banco de España, Bank Negara, Annual Report, various issues, and Bank of Thailand reports, various 
issues, Conselho Monetario Nacional, Brasil, (Dominguez and Tesar (2004). 
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Table 3. The Famous Chilean Case and Other Lesser Deities: 
Summary of Key Findings on “Effectiveness” 
 
 



























Cardoso & Goldfajn 
(1998) 
  Yes (ST)  Yes (ST)     
Edison & Reinhart  1994      No  No 





















Yes  Yes (ST)  Yes (ST)  Yes (ST) 
Edwards (1999)a      Yes  No  Yes (ST) 
Edwards (1999)b  1991:6-
1998:9 
No Yes No  Yes 




   Yes   
Hernández  & Schmidt-
Hebbel (1999) 
  Yes (ST)  Yes (ST)  No  Yes 
Labán, Larraín & 
Chumacero (1997) 
1985-1994 No  Yes     
Labán & Larraín 
(1998) 
        




Yes (ST)  Yes  No   
Le Fort & Budnevich 
(1997) 
1990-1994 No   
Yes 
Yes Yes 
Reinhart & Smith (1998)    Yes (ST)  Yes (ST)     






















          
          
 
Notes:  A blank entry refers to the cases where the study in question did not analyze that particular 
relationship. An (ST) refers to cases where only short-term effects were detected. 
1 Note that there are several studies on Malaysia’s 1998 capital controls targeting outflows.  Here, we are 
referring to the controls on capital inflows introduced in January 1994. 
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Table 3 (continued). The Famous Chilean Case and Other Lesser Deities: 
Summary of Key Findings on “Effectiveness” 
 
 



























Le Fort & Budnevich 
(1997) 
1990-1995 Yes  (ST)  Yes  Yes  Yes 
























































Notes:  A blank entry refers to the cases where the study in question did not analyze that particular 
relationship. An (ST) refers to cases where only short-term effects were detected. 
1 Note that there are several studies on Malaysia’s 1998 capital controls targeting outflows.  Here, we are 
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Table 4. The Famous Malaysian Case and Other Lesser Deities: 
Summary of Key Findings on “Effectiveness” 
 













composition of  
flows 
Reduce real 








Tamirisia (2004)  1991:1-
2002:12 
   No  Yes 
Dornbusch (2001)        No   
Edison & Reinhart (2000)        Yes  Yes 















Jose Vinals(1992)  1992  No        





























Notes:  A blank entry refers to the cases where the study in question did not analyze that particular 
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Table 5. The “Others” – Multicountry Studies 
Summary of Key Findings on “Effectiveness” 
 




























Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Mexico, Czech 
Republic, Egypt, Kenya 
and Uganda (1990-1996) 
No Yes  (ST)    No 




Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Czech Republic, Malaysia, 
Mexico, 
 Thailand, Indonesia, and 
Philippines 
Yes (ST)  Yes (ST)     






(monthly and quarterly 
data for 1992-1996 -before 
crisis- and from crisis time 
and 1 year ahead) 
    Yes 




Spain (1991-1993), and 
1995-1999 for Brazil, 
Malaysia, and Thailand. 
Control group: Philippines 
and South Korea (daily 
data) 
   No  No 





Belgium, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, India, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
The Netherlands, Norway, 
The Philippines, Portugal, 
South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Turkey, UK. 
(monthly data for 1971:1-
1998:12) 
   Yes  (ST)  No 
 
Notes:  A blank entry refers to the cases where the study in question did not analyze that particular 
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Table 6. Summary of Results By Country and Multi-country Studies 
 
 












of  flows 
 
Reduce real 







Complete Sample  Unclear Yes  Unclear  Yes 
        
Control on Inflows        
Brazil Unclear  Unclear  No  Unclear 
Chile Unclear  Yes  Unclear**  Yes 
Colombia Unclear  Unclear  Unclear  Yes 
Czech Republic  No  Yes     
Malaysia (1989)  Yes  Yes     
Malaysia (1994)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Thailand Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
Control on Outflows        
Malaysia (1998)      Unclear  Yes 
Spain Unclear    Unclear  Unclear 
Thailand Yes    Yes  Yes 
        
Multi-country studies  Yes Yes  Yes  No 
        
        
 
Note: Yes stands for yes, it worked; No for no, it did not work; Unclear for mixed results; and blanks for 
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Brazil 
CCE 0.00  0.00  -0.67  0.00  0 
WCCE 0.35  0.35  -0.275  -0.225  0.05 
           
Chile 
CCE -0.09  0.64  -0.27  0.45  0.18 
WCCE 0.03  0.67  -0.27  0.29  0.18 
           
Colombia 
CCE -0.33  -0.33  0.00  0.67  0.00 
WCCE -0.17  -0.17  0.00  0.07  -0.07 
           
Czech 
Republic 
CCE  -1.00  1.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
WCCE  -0.50  0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.10 
           
Malaysia 
CCE  1.00  1.00 0.50 0.50  0.75 
WCCE  0.30  0.30 0.05 0.05  0.18 
           
Thailand 
 
CCE  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 
WCCE  0.10  0.10 0.10 0.10  0.10 
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Malaysia 
CCE  0.20  0.00 0.00 0.80  0.25 
WCCE  0.02  0.00 0.00 0.62  0.16 
           
Spain 
CCE  0.50  0.00 0.50 0.50  0.38 
WCCE  0.05  0.00 0.20 0.20  0.11 
           
Thailand 
CCE  0.50  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.13 
WCCE 0.05  0.00  -0.50  -0.50  -0.24 
           
 
























       
CCE 0.00  0.40  0.00  -0.40 
WCCE -0.10 0.30 0.00  -0.40 
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Appendix Table 1 


















OLS controlling for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, IV, and VAR They control for endogeneity 
of capital controls (government’s reaction function) 
High 




Test for equality of moments and changes in persistence between capital controls and no controls, 
principal components analysis; block exogeneity tests (VAR) for causality; GARCH for the effects of 
controls on volatility; and Wald tests for structural brakes over a rolling window 
High 




Event comparison through  time- rescaling (labeling the implementation of controls as period “t”, and 
analyzing the evolution of the series in “t-1”, and through “t+2”. Detailed chronological description of the 











Extensive descriptive and comparative country-studies analysis of time-series in each episode, dividing 
facts according to controls on capital inflows (limiting short-term flows), control on capital outflows 
(financial crises), extensive exchange controls (financial crises), long standing controls and their 








IV and VAR. With these, hey address simultaneity problems, exogenous upward trend in capital flow, 
bias due to measurement error because of loopholes in controls. They consider two alternative measures 
of expected devaluations: (i)effective rate of depreciation; and  (ii) one step ahead forecast from a rolling 
ARMA. They consider two alternative measures of flows: (i) short tem flows to GDP; and (ii) total flows 
to GDP. 
High 
Edwards (1999)a  1994:10-
1999:1 
GARCH for changes in the short term central bank nominal interest rate, and changes in the log of the 
stock market index, using daily data. Descriptive analysis of the effects of capital controls on the 
composition of capital inflows, and domestic interest rates and monetary policy independence. 
High 
Edwards (1999)b  1991:6-
1998:9 
Descriptive analysis of the composition of capital flows during capital controls times. VAR on the effects 
of capital controls on the real exchange rate. GARCH for changes in the short term central bank nominal 
interest rate, and changes in the log of the stock market index. 
High 




Using stochastic calculus, they compute the shadow exchange rate and its bands. GARCH (effect of 
capital controls on propagation of external shocks. Estimate a mean and a variance equation. 
High 
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Appendix Table 1 (continued) 























Least squares estimation, controlling for spurious correlation, endogeniety of the RHS regressors, 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Co-integration analysis and error-correction model. TSLS 
estimation also included 
High 




Estimation of a special case of non-linear models in which a particular variable may adopt a certain law of 
motion conditional on an observation passed a threshold (special case of Markov Switching Regime 
Models, with the threshold replacing the transition matrix). They run a full sample parsimonious 
regression for each series, to determine variables to include in the threshold process; for given choice of 
threshold variable, they estimated the model and got the p-value associated with a null of a unique stable 
representation; if the latter is rejected in favor of threshold process chose the threshold variable that 
minimizes the sum of squares of residuals; and reduce the threshold model to a parsimonious 
representation. 
High 




Descriptive analysis of events, describing the context for implementing capital controls and the main 
macroeconomic effects. 
Low 





Linear and Cubic approximations of net inflows as primarily of interest rate differentials.  High 





Descriptive analysis of events, describing the context for implementing capital controls and the main 
macroeconomic. 
Low 




Event comparison through time- rescaling (labeling the implementation of controls as period “t”, and 
analyzing the evolution of the series in “t-1”, and through “t+2”. Detailed chronological description of the 
various measures applied in each economy 
Medium 
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Appendix Table 1 (continued) 














      





Error-correction representation (that is efficient) with a two-step procedure: (i) OLS estimation of the real 
exchange rate on a set of explanatory variables to contrast the estimated residuals; and (ii) use these 
residuals to estimate by OLS an error correction equation measuring the deviation of the dependent 
variable from its long term equilibrium level (given by (i)). They checked for several endogeneity and 









Descriptive analysis of events, describing the context for implementing capital controls and the main 
macroeconomic. 
Low 
Reinhart & Smith 
(1998) 
  Event comparison through  time- rescaling (labeling the implementation of controls as period “t”, and 
analyzing the evolution of the series in “t-1”, and through “t+2”. Detailed chronological description of 











Extensive descriptive and comparative country-studies analysis of time-series in each episode, 
dividing facts according to controls on capital inflows (limiting short-term flows), control on capital 
outflows (financial crises), extensive exchange controls (financial crises), long standing controls and 








Event comparison through  time- rescaling (labeling the implementation of controls as period “t”, and 
analyzing the evolution of the series in “t-1”, and through “t+2”. Detailed chronological description of 








Event comparison through  time- rescaling (labeling the implementation of controls as period “t”, and 
analyzing the evolution of the series in “t-1”, and through “t+2”. Detailed chronological description of 
the various measures applied in each economy 
Medium   42
Appendix Table 1 (concluded) 























Extensive descriptive and comparative country-studies analysis of time-series in each episode, 
dividing facts according to controls on capital inflows (limiting short-term flows), control on capital 
outflows (financial crises), extensive exchange controls (financial crises), long standing controls and 












Extensive descriptive and comparative country-studies analysis of time-series in each episode, 
dividing facts according to controls on capital inflows (limiting short-term flows), control on capital 
outflows (financial crises), extensive exchange controls (financial crises), long standing controls 
and their liberalization, rapid liberalization 
Low 
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Appendix Table 2 














Tamirisia (2004)  1991:1-
2002:12 
Error-correction model. Series on net foreign portfolio assets are by foreign portfolio assets to isolate 
country-specific effects 
High 
Dornbusch (2001)    Descriptive analysis of different variables  Low 
Edison & Reinhart 
(2000) 
  Test for equality of moments and changes in persistence between capital controls and no controls, 
principal components analysis; block exogeneity tests (VAR) for causality; GARCH for the effects 
of controls on volatility; and Wald tests for structural brakes over a rolling window 
High 




Shifted difference in differences to separate the counterfactual of capital controls versus IMF-based-
program recovery. This methodology enables the authors to re-schedule the episodes in terms of the 
timing of the crises (shifted). The difference in differences allows them to capture the comparison 
effect of the recovery with capital controls vis a vis with a successful IMF program, controlling for 











Extensive descriptive and comparative country-studies analysis of time-series in each episode, 
dividing facts according to controls on capital inflows (limiting short-term flows), control on capital 
outflows (financial crises), extensive exchange controls (financial crises), long standing controls and 
their liberalization, rapid liberalization 
Low 
      
 
Spain
Jose Viñals(1992)  1992  Descriptive analysis of economic policy measures and its effect on various macroeconomic variables  Low 




Test for equality of moments and changes in persistence between capital controls and no controls, 
principal components analysis; block exogeneity tests (VAR) for causality; GARCH for the effects 
of controls on volatility; and Wald tests for structural brakes over a rolling window 
High 
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Appendix Table 2 (continued) 





















Extensive descriptive and comparative country-studies analysis of time-series in each episode, 
dividing facts according to controls on capital inflows (limiting short-term flows), control on capital 
outflows (financial crises), extensive exchange controls (financial crises), long standing controls and 








Test for equality of moments and changes in persistence between capital controls and no controls, 
principal components analysis; block exogeneity tests (VAR) for causality; GARCH for the effects 











Extensive descriptive and comparative country-studies analysis of time-series in each episode, 
dividing facts according to controls on capital inflows (limiting short-term flows), control on capital 
outflows (financial crises), extensive exchange controls (financial crises), long standing controls and 
their liberalization, rapid liberalization 
Low 
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Appendix Table 3 











Montiel & Reinhart 
(1999) 
 1990-1996  They construct indices to measure incidence and intensity of capital account restrictions. Estimation 
of fix-effect panel regressions to explain volume and composition of capital flows. Results are 
checked for robustness by IV estimations. Covers Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Czech Republic, Egypt, Kenya 
and Uganda 
High 
      
Reinhart & Smith 
(1998) 
1990-1997  Event comparison through time- rescaling (labeling the implementation of controls as period “t”, and 
analyzing the evolution of the series in “t-1”, and through “t+2”. Detailed chronological description 
of the various measures applied in each economy. Covers Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia, and Philippines. 
Intermediate 
      
Kaplan & Rodrik 
(2002) 
1992-1996   Shifted difference in differences to separate the counterfactual of capital controls versus IMF-based-
program recovery. This methodology enables the authors to re-schedule the episodes in terms of the 
timing of the crises (shifted). The difference in differences allows them to capture the comparison 
effect of the recovery with capital controls vis a vis with a successful IMF program, controlling for 
exogenous and country-specific effects (static and dynamics). Covers Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia (monthly and quarterly data for 1992-1996 -before crisis- and from crisis time and 1 year 
ahead) 
 
      
Edison & Reinhart 
(1999) 
1991-1999  Test for equality of moments and changes in persistence between capital controls and no controls, 
principal components analysis; block exogeneity tests (VAR) for causality; GARCH for the effects of 
controls on volatility; and Wald tests for structural brakes over a rolling window. Covers Spain 
(1991-1993), and 1995-1999 for Brazil, Malaysia, and Thailand. Control group: Philippines and 
South Korea 
High 
      
   46
Appendix Table 3 (concluded) 
















Panel VAR and individual country VAR of commodity prices, US industrial production , US 
consumers prices, foreign industrial production, foreign interest rates, US Fed Funds Rate, non-
borrowed reserves to reserves ratio and nominal exchange rate in response to a 25 basis points 
increase in the Fed Funds Rate. For the country level VAR they regress each country separately, 
compute the cumulative exchange rate and interest rate responses, and finally regress country–
specific responses on the values of capital control index, exchange rate regime, degree of 
dollarization, and trade integration. Covers Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, The 
Netherlands, Norway, The Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK 
High 